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Mr. Murphy called to suggest that you
read attached; he said he had spoken to
you about it.

Debbie
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tween their legitimate security needs and our willingness, or lack thereof, to make available topline American fighter aircraft. As conceived, this bridge would be the FX, a more highly capable supersonic fighter than the United States had ever before sold in Latin America, though one possessing something slightly less than the full measure of technological sophistication embodied in the highest-performance U.S. fighters. Given the leadtimes required for aircraft development, the FX is just now about to become available for export sale—in the form of either the F-5G or the F-16/79.

Unfortunately, just as the FX concept might have been implemented, the Reagan administration has dealt it a severe blow by offering to sell to Venezuela 24 F-16's, which are among the most advanced of American fighters. In justification, administration officials have argued that as "the key to stability in the Caribbean area," Venezuela deserves to receive our best aircraft—particularly since Cuba has now been equipped with Soviet Mig-23's. Unless we accede to Venezuela's request, so the argument runs, its Government will turn elsewhere to purchase the high-performance aircraft needed to insure Venezuelan security and to protect the adjacent Caribbean sealand.

Regrettably, this rationale is more facile than persuasive. Venezuela is, to be sure, an important U.S. ally—both as an oil supplier and as a stable and prospering Latin American democracy. But the case has simply not been made that Venezuela's quite legitimate security needs could not be effectively met by the FX. It remains in fact quite unclear just what the threat is to which the F-16 is being sent as a response. Although frequently cited, the Mig-23's located in Cuba are no more capable than the F-5G and their use against Venezuela or its adjacent sealand is implausible in the extreme. Indeed, what conceivable act of overt Cuban aggression would not be met with a full U.S. military response, and from bases which are essentially as close to the region as are Cuba's?

Meanwhile, in contrast to a Cuban threat which is almost wholly hypothetical, the F-16 sale will itself produce a danger which is real: the possibility of a regional arms race. Having supplied the F-16 to Venezuela, the United States will now be hard-pressed to explain to other Latin American governments—such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, or Ecuador—why they should purchase aircraft of lesser capability. As a result, the very concept of the FX is imperiled, and the prospects for future restraint wane.

As this now occurs, one is reminded of a U.S. choice made over a decade ago in the nuclear realm—the decision to deploy MIRVed warheads on American intercontinental ballistic missiles. At the time, this action was justified as one which enhanced U.S. security by taking advantage of our

technological lead. Some in this body argued that since this lead was only temporary and the Soviets would soon emulate U.S. actions, we should seize the opportunity to negotiate a ban on MIRV's. But we were ignored. The result was a proliferation of MIRVed warheads in both the American and Soviet arsenals which has rendered the United States less secure than before.

As the consequences of the F-16 sale to Venezuela now begin to reverberate slowly through Latin America, I fear that those advocating restraint will again be proven correct. Unfortunately, such proof arrives only when a mistake is too old to retrieve. We must thus await history's verdict as to whether once more, in seeking to strengthen American security, we have acted with expediency but to our long-term detriment.

NATIONAL SECURITY

MR. WARNER. Mr. President, recently George F. Murphy, Jr., the director of the Senate National Security Office spoke on the issue of national security at a seminar conducted by the Behavioral Research Center in Dallas, Tex.

I have read the speech carefully, and I believe it points out certain inadequacies in our defense posture and clearly illustrates Soviet activities in the field of subversion and destabilization.

I commend this speech to my colleagues as a valued reference piece, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY GEORGE F. MURPHY, JR.

INTRODUCTION

I am extremely pleased to address this seminar on the subject of national security.

The safeguarding of our Nation depends on a number of interrelated factors including: a sound economy (with a stable flow of energy to keep the wheels of industry turning), a solid and resilient political system and a military capability second to none.

As representatives of major energy companies, you are well aware of our dependence on foreign sources of energy, but the American people did not understand or fully comprehend this dependency until we all waited in gas lines in 1973 and again in 1979. We saw energy prices skyrocket, but what hit home was the plain fact that we ran out of gas. The No Gas Today sign revealed an unexpected vulnerability.

There are many complex reasons for this vulnerability, and certainly one was the slowing down of the orderly development of the United States civilian nuclear power program.

Today, we are in a period when there are no gas lines, when prices have dropped, however slightly, and when only last month Newsweek had an article entitled, "The Oil Glut Won't Go Away." There is nothing like healthy competition to keep the price down. But, from the long range point of view, the problem remains unsolved.

Government and industry must come up with a coherent program to insure—to use

an overworked phrase—energy independence. All of you are aware of the many and varied programs and proposals to reach this goal, and I do not propose to rehash these before this august group. Rather, I want to address the larger external threat that we face, and I want to point out where we have been and what twists and turns in our strategy have placed us in a position of military insufficiency in a world fraught with danger.

The direction of American foreign policy

In the 1943 movie Casablanca, Humphrey Bogart's piano-playing friend sang a now famous song which includes the words, "The fundamental things apply as time goes by." Since 1945, we seem to have forgotten some of the fundamental geopolitical facts of life. We have moved—sometimes imperceptibly, sometimes dramatically—from a position of unsurpassed military, economic and political strength to what has been described by some of our leaders in the recent past as "essential equivalence" or "relative parity" in our military relationship with the only potential adversary on the horizon—the Soviet Union.

What happened to bring our Nation from victory in World War II to the scarred sands and burned wreckage of our failed rescue mission in the Iranian desert? As Al Smith once said, "Let's look at the record."

Post World War II

The United States emerged from World War II as the strongest military power on earth. The Soviet Union, although weakened by the wartime fighting, was probably number two. Britain, France and other allies had suffered considerable losses in terms of men and material. Our industrial base was untouched. We lent an economic hand to friend and foe alike. We reduced our armed services and we paid scant attention to Prime Minister Churchill's warning of danger from the East.

The benchmarks of post World War II change are fairly easy to identify.

The Berlin Blockade—1948.—Although the Soviet Union did not have a single atomic bomb at that time, they blockaded Berlin. We responded with an airlift, to fly food and coal to Berlin. In the face of the spirit of the people of Berlin as well as in response to world-wide pressure, the Soviets and East Germany lifted the blockade—they had to wait until 1961 to again isolate Berlin by building what became known as the Wall of Shame.

The Korean Conflict—1950.—The North Koreans, with Soviet backing, launched an attack on South Korea. We came to the defense of South Korea, and three years later settled for a tie at the 38th parallel.

Hungary—1956.—In October, 1956, Hungarian secret police and Soviet military elements fired on a crowd of unarmed Hungarian students, killing and wounding many. Outraged, the people rose against the Government. For a short time the Soviets negotiated with the Government of Imre Nagy while they brought in troops from the Soviet Ukraine. During the night of November 3-4, the Soviets surrounded Budapest, cut it off, and sent tanks in to attack the freedom fighters. The battle of Budapest ended within days.

On November 4, the Soviets vetoed a U.S. resolution proposing the UN Security Council censure of the Russian military attack on Hungary.

The Bay of Pigs—1961.—In April, 1961, a fundamental blunder, which was to have international ramifications and what the Soviet appetite for expansion, occurred with the failure at the Bay of Pigs.

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Whatever the reasons, no matter where the blame should be placed, the bottom line was that the United States could not successfully carry out an operation against a Marxist regime run by Fidel Castro.

The Berlin Wall—1961.—On Sunday, August 13, 1961, perhaps testing another weak spot, the Soviets, working through their East German allies, began construction of the Berlin Wall.

From the communist point of view, the wall was an absolute necessity because, given the choice of life behind the Iron Curtain or freedom in Western Europe, a mass exodus of East German refugees was taking place through West Berlin. From August 1 to August 13, more than 16,000 East Germans had registered at West Berlin centers after having escaped from communist East Germany. More than 4,100 people had registered at West Berlin in the last 24 hours that the border was open.

The United States and our NATO allies vigorously protested the violation of the Four-Power Agreement on the Status of Berlin, but again, the bottom line was and still is that the United States and its NATO allies did not stop the construction of the Berlin Wall.

The Cuban Missile Crisis—1962.—Perhaps emboldened by the success of the Berlin Wall episode, the Soviets decided to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. Because we still had strategic nuclear weapons superiority and because Soviet lines of communications could not supply or support Cuba in the event of conventional hostilities, the Russians withdrew the missiles following the direct confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR in October of that year.

At the conclusion of the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told John McCloy: "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."

Czechoslovakia, August 1968.—During the night of August 20-21, 1968, the armed forces of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia.

Prague was seized in an air-borne operation. Military transport planes, backed by MIG jet fighters, began landing troops in great numbers beginning shortly after 1 a.m., August 21. Among the first units to land at previously secured airports around Prague were detachments of the KGB.

The Vietnam Conflict—1960-1975.—It is difficult to give an exact date for the beginning of the Vietnam entanglement, but it is easy to remember the end—when U.S. helicopters were evacuating Americans and South Vietnamese from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.

A Soviet Opportunity.—While America was attempting to extricate itself from the morass of Vietnam and while we were occupied with Watergate and its aftermath, the Soviets began expanding their influence in Africa, using Cuban and East German surrogates to solidify their position particularly in Angola and Ethiopia.

Today, according to Aviation Week, there are 1,000 Soviets and 20,000 Cubans in Angola. It has been suggested that the Soviets are playing a passive role, but I am sure you remember that last September, the New York Times reported that two Soviet lieutenant colonels were killed, and the South Africans captured a Soviet sergeant major during a military strike against guerrilla bases in southern Angola.

It has also been estimated in the press that there are 18,000 Cubans and 4,000 Soviets in Ethiopia and 40 Soviet aircraft, 200 tanks and 5,000 Soviet advisors in Tanzania. There are Soviet advisors in several other countries in Africa.

Detente and the SALT Process.—The 1970s.—You are all aware of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. SALT I began in 1969 and ended in 1972 with the signing of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement for the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

SALT negotiations continued into 1979, and ended with the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II). It is not my intention to discuss these treaties in detail here, but I would like to point out an example in each of them where it would appear that the Soviet Union ended up in an advantageous position.

The Protocol to the Interim Agreement states:

"The U.S. may have . . . no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have . . . no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines."

Not only did the Soviets obtain a 62-44 advantage, but because the key word in the text is "modern" nuclear submarines, the Soviets did not have to count the subs equipped with ballistic missiles which are not technically classified as "modern." Therefore, the ratio goes to over 90 vs. 44.

The SALT II Treaty was signed on June 18, 1979. There is sophisticated language which allows the Soviets to keep their 308 heavy ICBMs but does not allow the U.S. to build any "heavy" ICBMs.

Senator Howard H. Baker, now the Majority Leader of the Senate, in a press conference on June 27, 1979, announced his opposition to the Treaty. He pointed out the discrepancy of allowing the Soviets 308 heavy missiles and 0 for the U.S. He also said:

"For example, the 308 heavy missiles allowed to the Soviet Union under this treaty have firepower equal to all of our strategic ballistic missile systems put together."

Senator Jackson commenting on the same issue, said on the Senate floor:

"Why, for example, should we sign a SALT Treaty that will permit the Russians to have more than 300 large, modern intercontinental missiles while we are allowed none?"

President Carter signed the Treaty, but later because of the Afghan invasion, he asked the Senate to delay consideration of it.

U.S. vs. Soviet, the Changing Military Balance Favoring the Soviet Union

Very few remember that in 1961—20 years ago—the Russians detonated the largest nuclear weapon ever set off in the atmosphere (55-60 megatons).

In 1962, the Soviets miscalculated the American response to Russian nuclear weapons in Cuba and, given the relative balance of nuclear weapons power at that time which still favored the U.S., had to back down. This miscalculation probably cost Khrushchev his job.

It seems clear that following this confirmation the Soviets began a determined, long-range military buildup aimed at obtaining clear superiority over the United States. Let me give a few comparisons to support this contention.

ICBMs.—The new and improved Soviet ICBMs (SS-17, 18, and 19) which became operational about 1974 are more up-to-date than our ICBMs. One version of the SS-18 has a warhead yield of about 24 megatons according to Aviation Week. This yield is, of course, significantly larger than any U.S. ICBM. The operational SS-18 is about twice the size of the proposed U.S. MX according to Secretary of Defense Weinberger.

The Titan II, the largest U.S. ICBM, became operational in 1963. A nearly 20-year-old missile, it has been plagued with fuel leaks and mechanical problems. There were 54 Titan silos, but two are out of commission as a result of accidents. The remaining 52 silos have been the subject of repeated calls for closing them down because of the questionable reliability of the missiles.

The U.S. has 1,000 Minuteman II and III missiles. They are 10 to 15 years old and vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

Bombers.—The Soviet Backfire B bomber became operational in 1974. This bomber has the capability of reaching the U.S. on a one-way mission. The Backfire is roughly comparable to the U.S. B-1 bomber. The difference between the two is that the Soviets have more than 150 Backfires in operation. The U.S. has no B-1s in operation.

The B-52s, the backbone of our bomber force, are all more than 20 years old, and by FAA standards, if they were civilian aircraft, they could be classified as antiques.

Nuclear Subs.—The United States led the world in the development of nuclear powered submarines beginning with the launching of the Nautilus in 1954. The Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missile submarines, and our nuclear-powered attack submarines gave the U.S. primacy on the high seas for more than two decades.

This is no longer the case. A document entitled "Soviet Military Power," by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, says that the Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine designated ALFA is "believed to be the fastest submarine in service today in any Navy."

Not only in ballistic missile and attack submarines, but in all types of submarines our lead has disappeared.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Hayward said: "In 1980 the Soviets delivered 12 submarines to their operating forces. We delivered one."

In comparing the latest U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile submarines, Admiral Hayward said:

"Typhoon is the largest submarine ever constructed, displacing about 25,000 tons submerged—almost 50 percent more than our Ohio class (Trident) ballistic missile submarines. . . ."

The Turn of the Screw

In the mid-1970s, as the capability and effectiveness of the Soviet long-range nuclear weapons increased to equal and then surpass the United States, it became obvious to the free world that U.S. strategic striking power could not be counted on to hold back Soviet expansion outward from what Mackinder and Haushofer referred to as the World Island.

At about this time the Soviets began to intensify their use of surrogates and clandestine activities to expand their global influence.

Subversion, Destabilization and Expansion

I have already mentioned arenas where these political and military penetrations were and are still taking place: Angola and Ethiopia. Of course, the area most crucial to our energy needs—the Middle East—is still the most sensitive and critical target.

It is axiomatic that nations conducting covert and subversive activities, design their operations so as to prevent disclosure and allow for plausible denial. It is rare that we find "the smoking gun." To illustrate this point, let me briefly outline some interesting coincidences that took place in the Middle East in 1979. There is no "smoking gun," but perhaps the sequence of these events may give some insight into the grey area of international intrigue.

Prelude to Afghanistan

On Tuesday morning, February 14, 1979, two incidents took place that may have been coordinated. At 8:45 a.m., local time, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan "Spike" Dubs was kidnapped. Four hours later he was shot to death in a Kabul hotel.

According to an unclassified State Department report, Soviet officials took an operational role just prior and during the assault on the hotel room where Ambassador Dubs was held prisoner.

The unclassified State Department report says in part:

"One Soviet was observed assisting an Afghan security official with the loading of a weapon; another Soviet was observed providing an Afghan official with what appeared to be a small projectile, and two Soviets were observed positioning snipers on balconies across the street from the hotel room. The latter same Soviets were also observed later motioning the snipers to cease fire following 40 seconds of intensive gunfire into the hotel room."

On the same day (February 14) and at almost the same hour that Ambassador Dubs was kidnapped, the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was invaded by Marxist guerrillas who held Ambassador William Sullivan and his staff against their will. An eye witness report in the Washington Post, February 15, 1979, states in part:

"One attacker called himself a communist. Others said they were left-wing Fedayeen guerrillas."

The following day (February 15), according to the New York Times:

"The United States accused the Soviet Union today of efforts to help foment anti-American actions in Iran."

Nine months later, on November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Iran was completely overrun and 50 hostages were taken and held for over a year.

On November 12, 1979, the Soviet clandestine radio in Baku beamed to Iran the following:

"The relentless and national battle of our fighting people against the mad and blood thirsty U.S. imperialism has justly opened a new golden page in the history of the anti-imperialist struggles of awakened nations. The ugly visage of U.S. imperialism has been revealed more than ever around the world."

On November 18, 1979, the Washington Star carried the following item:

"After repeated American protests the Soviet Union abruptly turned off a series of inflammatory anti-American broadcasts aimed at Iran."

On November 20, 1979, the Mosque at Mecca was seized by several hundred well-armed individuals. Almost immediately, the false word reached Pakistan that the U.S. was somehow involved.

On November 21, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad was attacked and burned by an anti-American mob. Two military men were killed, and as many as 100 Americans escaped by going through a steel hatch onto the roof of the Embassy. As a side note, Reuters later reported that as the embers smoldered, Soviet security men were caught and ejected from inside the U.S. Embassy compound. The headline read, "Soviet Attempt Reported to Rifle Pakistan Ruins."

On December 2, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, was sacked by an anti-American mob of students. In an interview published nine days later in the New York Times Colonel Qadhafi is quoted as saying:

"That he believed the attacks on Americans in Iran and his own country were only the beginning of an international revolution against the United States."

During December, the tempo of Soviet military intervention increased and finally after the Russians had repeatedly denied military involvement, on Christmas Eve, the Soviet Union began its massive invasion of Afghanistan.

Was it coincidental that the American Ambassador in Afghanistan had been killed in a Soviet-guided shootout within hours of the seizing of the American Ambassador to Iran by a Marxist mob?

Was it coincidental that just prior to and during the attack on the U.S. Embassy in November, the Russian-based clandestine radio beamed at Teheran was heaping abuses on the U.S.—so much so that the U.S. protested to the Soviet Union?

Was it coincidental that on the other side of Afghanistan, an anti-U.S. mob was somehow led to believe that the Americans were involved in the Grand Mosque attack and thus they sacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad—just weeks before Soviet tanks, trucks and troops rolled into Kabul, Afghanistan?

It is difficult to pin down but this gives an indication of the instability and difficulties our Nation faces in this troubled world.

The Threat to Central America

Over the years, the Soviets have built up the Cuban military capability. Again, the Cubans, acting as Soviet surrogates, provided help to the guerrillas who overthrew the government of Nicaragua, and they are currently supporting guerrilla attacks against the government of El Salvador.

In this connection, on February 23, 1981, Secretary of State Haig published a report entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador." This report presents evidence of the clandestine military support given by the Soviet Union, Cuba and their communist allies to Marxist/Leninist guerrillas waiting to overthrow the established government of El Salvador.

Terrorism

Terrorism is as old as history. Who are these present day fanatics? Who do they represent? Where are they trained? Again, it is fundamental to look at the record.

They name themselves—the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigade, the Japan Red Army.

Who are their leaders? People like "Carlos" Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, a dedicated communist terrorist, trained in Cuba under KGB Colonel Simenov and educated in Moscow and violently against the institutions of the free world; the man who engineered the assault on OPEC Headquarters in Vienna.

What do they say? A Red Brigade communique, following their kidnapping of Brigadier General Dozier, states in part:

"Construct the anti-imperialist fighting front for a new internationalism, fight together and united to win with all communists and with all the populations who fight against imperialism."

Where are they trained? In the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and South Yemen, the only Marxist state in the Middle East, to name a few.

High Technology—Trading with the Soviet Union

Lenin is quoted as saying in essence "the capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them."

Providing the Soviet Union with technology which will increase their military as well as their economic capabilities seems to go far in support of Lenin's thesis.

A couple of weeks ago, I began listing high technology equipment that the United States was selling to the Soviet Union. Items such as bits for drilling oil, advanced

computers, equipment to build the pipeline between West Germany and the Soviet Union.

It seemed to me that such equipment should not be sent to a country that has a record of acting against the interest of the United States.

My comments were overtaken by events. President Reagan, as you know, has announced a suspension of licenses for the export of high technology equipment and material to the Soviet Union. I can only add that this move makes eminent sense.

Summary

I have tried to show that the military balance of power has slowly shifted toward the Soviet Union. I have also pointed out that the Soviets and their surrogates have greatly increased their efforts in subversion and covert activities.

The attack on the free world and more specifically, on the United States is many faceted. I have not touched on the vast espionage activities of the Soviets in the United States which FBI Director Webster referred to on TV a couple of weeks ago. I have not taken time to list the penetrations of U.S. and allied intelligence services.

There are those who have chosen to ignore this growing imbalance and increased hegemony and brutal expansion by the Soviet Union.

We have been through a period of detente which appears to only have strengthened the Soviet Union at our expense. We have used words—rhetoric—rationalizations—to explain the constant encroachment of the Soviet Union. These rationalizations and downplaying of the potential threat reminds me of the Hans Christian Andersen fable of the king who was surrounded by courtiers who kept telling the king how beautiful his robes were. It took a young child, unsophisticated in the ways of the court, to exclaim that the emperor had no clothes on.

I think that we are beginning to understand what the Soviets are up to and hopefully, we will apply fundamental logic and rebuild our defenses so that our Nation again will become second to none.

A NEWSPAPERMAN'S NEWSMAN

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, anyone who has served even a short time in public life realizes very quickly that much of our activity involves a close working relationship with the press no matter what office we hold. Over the years that I have served in public life, first as a State legislator, then as a Member of the House of Representatives and as U.S. Senator, I have had the good fortune to get to know and work with hundreds of newsmen and newswomen. In the State of Maryland every officeholder, whether at the National, State, or local level, sooner or later crossed paths with the Baltimore Sun's peerless political reporter, Charles G. Whiteford, who died recently.

Charlie Whiteford was a newspaperman's newsman. He had the intelligence of a German shepherd, the scrappiness of a bulldog and the tenacity of a bloodhound. As a matter of fact, Charlie's stories always had a bite to them. He got the news first, fast, and accurately and trained a generation of young reporters in the skills